









If two individuals, A and B, have a dispute over some purely private matter, and an 
English civil court finds that A has wronged B, the court is likely to award B a 
remedy. But B cannot, instead of seeking a remedy, ask the court to review A’s 
alleged wrongfulness to determine if A’s action (or inaction) shows him to have not 
understood, or to have disregarded, the extent of his legal powers.1 But then why 
would B ever want a court to take this path? B is claiming that A failed to conform to 
an obligation he had to her, and so she wants the court to rule on liability for that 
failure. A court which understood its function to be to ascertain if A had somehow 
misinterpreted or exceeded his legal powers would be ignoring the simple fact that B 
litigated in the hope of getting a right enforced. If a court were to presume that B 
wanted nothing more than a determination as to whether A exercised his powers 
lawfully, it would be treating a private law action as if it were a judicial review 
application. 
 No English court would presume anything of the sort, because wholly private 
disputes are the domain of private law and judicial review belongs to public law.2 
                                                        
 Law Department, London School of Economics. I am grateful to Mark Aronson, Julia Black, Carol 
Harlow, Michael Lobban, Martin Loughlin, Thomas Poole, Grégoire Webber, and the journal’s 
reviewers for comments on drafts.  
1 There will, of course, be instances where B challenges A’s exercise of (or failure to exercise) a power – 
as when beneficiary B objects to how trustee A has exercised a power of appointment under a trust – 
and a court might even use language similar to that used in the context of judicial review when ruling 
on that challenge (see, e.g., Re Manisty’s Settlement [1974] Ch 17, 26 (Templeman J)). But these are not 
procedural challenges of the kind that a complainant makes when she objects that a public body has 
exercised its powers unlawfully.  
2  Public lawyers sometimes see parallels between some of the higher decision-making standards 
imposed in private law contexts (such as the fiduciary’s obligation to act in good faith and in the 
interests of the beneficiaries) and the decision-making standards imposed on bodies governed by public 
law – the core argument being that the standards of considerate decision-making in public and private 
contexts correspond to such a degree that it makes little if any sense to speak of judicial review as if it 
were based on distinctively public law principles: see, e.g., Dawn Oliver, “Review of (Non-Statutory) 
Discretions”, in Judicial Review and the Constitution, ed. C. Forsyth (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 307-325. The 
argument is tangential to this article and it is impossible to do it justice in a note. I would only suggest 
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The public-private distinction, however, is notoriously fuzzy. Reviewable decisions 
need not stay reviewable: some old cases in which mandamus lay to individuals 
removed from office, for example, were, by the twentieth century, being treated as 
employment contract disputes.3 And certainly the domain of reviewability expands. 
Perhaps the most obvious modern illustration of expansion is the judicial shift of 
focus from the source to the nature of a decision-making body’s power when 
determining reviewability, so that decisions made by private bodies whose powers 
are in some way woven into the fabric of government regulation (for example, where 
bodies carry out work which would otherwise have to be undertaken by a 
government department) can be amenable to judicial review.4 Some public lawyers 
would have the courts broaden the scope of judicial review by developing yet more 
accommodating conceptions of public decision-making. 5  There have even been 
recommendations that the High Court’s powers of judicial review should sometimes 
extend to the decisions of private operators performing non-public functions.6  
 But would anyone say that judicial review should be available to B when her 
grievance is confined to the allegation that A’s action (or inaction) contravenes his 
obligations under private law? The argument for extending the supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                              
that it might not withstand careful scrutiny. The fact that trustees “[g]enerally … must not profit from 
the trust” (ibid 309), for example, seems not to support the conclusion that trustees are under the same 
“duties of selflessness and altruism” (ibid 310) as are public decision-makers (the word “generally” is 
presumably being used to capture the fact that, while fiduciaries will be stripped of secret profits, they 
will be entitled to profit from their position if authorized to do so by either the settlor or the 
beneficiaries). The argument might best be contested, in any event, on its conclusion rather than its 
detail. To conclude that public law and private law are conceptually alike seems but a precursor to the 
more intriguing question: yet we know that there are differences (that judicial review features in English 
public law, for example, but not in English private law) – how are we to account for these differences?  
3 See Stuart Anderson, “Judicial Review”, in The Oxford History of the Laws of England. Volume XI: 1820-
1914 English Legal System, ed. W. Cornish, S. Anderson, R. Cocks, M. Lobban, P. Polden & K. Smith 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010), 486-522 at 507; Stephen Sedley, Freedom, Law and Justice (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999), 36-7; and cf. Middleton’s case (1662) 1 Sid. 169, where the King’s Bench held that a 
mandamus should be granted to restore Middleton to his post as treasurer of a water company, even 
though the company “was only a thing of private concernment … not touching the public”. 
4  R. v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] QB 815 (CA). The test described in 
parenthesis of a private body performing a public function – that the body has undertaken an initiative 
which, had it not undertaken it, would have had to come within the remit of a government department 
– has regularly been criticized by administrative lawyers. It is sometimes difficult if not impossible to 
say with certainty that a task would have been undertaken by the government but for a private body’s 
initiative. Even if a court could be sure that the government would not have undertaken a task 
performed by a private body, furthermore, it is not clear why it should follow that the private body’s 
decisions cannot be reviewed, given that on some matters governments might endorse private bodies 
performing certain functions while not being prepared to take responsibility for carrying out those 
functions themselves.  
5 See, e.g., Mark Elliott, “Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and Purposes: Joining the Dots” [2012] 
NZ L Rev 75; Julia Black, “Constitutionalising Self-Regulation” (1996) 59 MLR 24.  
6 See, e.g., Gordon Borrie, “The Regulation of Public and Private Power” [1989] PL 552, 558; Sedley, 
Freedom, Law and Justice, 28-30; also William A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the 
British Constitution, 2nd edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 1947), 507.  
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jurisdiction of the Administrative Court has never been that the exercise of all private 
decision-making powers should, in principle, be amenable to judicial review. Rather, 
it has been that the decisions of some bodies (usually large corporate entities) 
currently categorized as private ought to be made reviewable, and that the key to 
making those decisions reviewable is either to redefine the decisions as “public” or to 
show them to be somehow on a par with the decisions of bodies performing public 
functions.7 No one, so far as I can tell, has ever argued that there should be no limits 
to the reach of judicial review; it appears to be commonly accepted that a line must 
be drawn somewhere (which does not mean that the line stays put or that nobody 
would have it moved).  
 Although the outer limits of English judicial review have not remained fixed, 
it is simple enough to state where the border currently lies. In English law, only 
decisions made by public bodies, or bodies understood to be performing public 
functions, are amenable to judicial review. 8  Purely private decisions cannot be 
reviewed. But making sense of why this should be so can be difficult. A decision by a 
private body could have consequences similar to a decision by a public one, the 
substantive principles of judicial review do not apply exclusively to cases concerning 
the exercise of public power, and the reasons for categorizing a body as public can 
sometimes seem strained. In this article, I shall try to identify and assess the reasons 
which can be adduced to explain why the High Court’s judicial review powers are 
exclusive to public law. My basic argument is that particular explanations for the 
confinement of judicial review do not always do the work that they are supposed to 
do and that the most convincing explanations are perhaps some of the more prosaic 
ones, mainly concerning remedies, procedure, and the simple fact that, in some 
contexts, judicial review of decisions made by private bodies is legally prohibited. I 
should emphasize at the outset that my objective is certainly not to stack up these 
explanations so as to knock them all down, as if the confinement of judicial review to 
public law is somehow foolhardy. That there are inherent limits to the range of rights 
capable of being vindicated by way application for judicial review seems obvious. I 
do, however, hope that my necessarily schematic and sometimes tentative account of 
                                                        
7 See, e.g., Black, “Constitutionalising Self-Regulation”, 51-5. 
8 I will normally use shorthand and refer simply to the decisions of public bodies (with the intention that 
this be read to include private bodies which operate as de facto public bodies by exercising public 
functions). I will refer to non-public bodies as “private”, “domestic”, and “self-regulating”, varying the 
terms to cut down on monotony. My references to bodies’ decisions should be understood to include the 
exercise of powers more generally (including failure to exercise powers). 
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the explanations for the confinement of judicial review casts some light (or at least 
prompts reflection) on why it is difficult and probably impossible to say what the 
absolute outer limits of the Administrative Court’s supervisory jurisdiction could 




Jurisdiction – understood broadly – is one of the standard explanations for the 
confinement of judicial review to public law.9 Jurisdiction is conferred on a public 
body: its powers are derived from statute, the royal prerogative, or the common law; 
they are not derived from the fact of consent between parties. The point of judicial 
review will, more often than not, be to determine if a public body, in reaching a 
decision, has somehow either acted outside its jurisdiction or made an error of law 
within its jurisdiction. 10  A purely private body, by contrast, is not conferred 
jurisdiction but rather derives its decision-making competence from its own 
regulations. Imagine that a self-governing organization’s regulations stipulate that 
acceptance of those regulations is a condition of membership, and that any dispute 
between the organization and its members (or prospective members) must be settled 
by a panel set up by the organization itself. A decision by this panel could not be 
challenged on the basis that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the dispute, because 
its jurisdiction is established by the organization’s internal arrangements. Following 
this line of argument, judicial review is inappropriate to arbitration arrangements 
agreed between, say, an individual and a private body because the fact of both 
parties having accepted these arrangements means that the private body’s 
jurisdiction can be taken for granted. 
The reason for seeking judicial review, however, might be that a body’s 
                                                        
9 In the context of English judicial review, the concept of jurisdiction has traditionally been used to refer 
specifically to statutory jurisdiction (with a distinction drawn between jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional error), thereby confining public powers to powers underpinned by statute. Nowadays, the 
concept is considered unduly narrow and is generally eschewed by the courts. An account of how 
“jurisdiction” has been superseded by “public source” and “public authority” would detract from my 
general argument, and so I have retained the concept. But it should be noted that I am employing the 
concept broadly to cover all publicly sourced power rather than just jurisdiction as traditionally 
understood within ultra vires doctrine.  
10 Judicial review proceedings will sometimes raise questions of fact – e.g., when the finding upon 
which an impugned action depends is unsupported by evidence. But questions of fact arise far less 
frequently in judicial review as compared with private law cases because the reason for judicial review 
is to determine if an action was lawful. See Harry Woolf, “Public Law – Private Law: Why the Divide?” 
[1986] PL 220, 225. 
 5 
decision is challenged as unlawful rather than beyond its jurisdiction. Private bodies 
can make decisions which exceed or run contrary to the powers which they have 
established for themselves (as well as powers conferred on them by statute and the 
common law), and, when these decisions are challenged, courts are able to decide on 
their lawfulness. Courts, when they make these decisions, are not engaging in 
judicial review. Nevertheless, the standards of procedural fairness and 
reasonableness that courts apply when considering an appeal challenging the 
decision of a domestic tribunal are essentially the same as the ones they apply when 
reviewing the decisions of bodies performing public functions. That a tribunal “is not 
subject to judicial review because it is not a public body”, according to Lord Woolf, 
does not mean that it escapes the supervision of the High Court…. The [tribunal]'s 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff arises out of a contract. That contract has an implied 
requirement that the procedure provided for … be conducted fairly…. [I]f the 
[tribunal] does not act fairly or if it misdirects itself in law and fails to take into 
account relevant considerations or takes into account irrelevant considerations, the 
High Court can intervene.11 
“[T]he language of judicial review”, Richards J observed in 2004, is “just as 
applicable” in cases concerning the decisions of tribunals which derive their 
authority from the agreement between the relevant parties as it is in relation to the 
decisions of public bodies.12 For in cases concerning private bodies’ decisions,  
[t]he function of the court … is to ensure that the primary decision-maker operated 
within lawful limits. It is a review function, very similar to that of the court on 
judicial review. Indeed, given the difficulties that sometimes arise in drawing the 
precise boundary between the two, I would consider it surprising and unsatisfactory 
if a private law claim in relation to the decision of a domestic body required the court 
to adopt a materially different approach from a judicial review claim in relation to the 
decision of a public body. In each case the essential concern should be with the 
lawfulness of the decision taken: whether the procedure was fair, whether there was 
any error of law, whether any exercise of judgment or discretion fell within the limits 
open to the decision-maker, and so forth.13 
Whether the body being challenged is public or private, in other words, the 
                                                        
11 Wilander v Tobin [1997] 2 Ll Rep. 293, 299-300. See also Nagle v Fielden [1966] 2 QB 633, 644-5 (Lord 
Denning, MR), 653 (Salmon LJ) (“Once … a man is elected to a club, he acquires contractual rights and 
cannot be expelled save in accordance with its rules and by processes which do not offend against 
natural justice”).  
12 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 at [40].  
13 Ibid at [37]. See also Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 2030 at [12] (Davis J).  
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court’s supervisory function is to consider if its acts and decisions amounted to a 
lawful exercise of power. The approach taken in private law proceedings, under Part 
8 of the Civil Procedure Rules, is much the same as that which the Administrative 
Court would take had the exercise of the power raised a public law issue.14 Judges 
assess the decisions of private tribunals according to essentially the same criteria that 
they apply when reviewing the decisions of public ones.  
Whereas parliament has never been inclined to pass laws intended to remove 
the jurisdiction of the courts over disputes between private citizens, it has been 
known to pass laws intended to stop citizens from going to court to challenge the 
lawfulness of decisions which public bodies have made against them. So might 
judicial review be confined to public law because parliament sometimes legislates 
with the aim of ousting or restricting the courts’ jurisdiction to scrutinize a body’s 
decisions? For three reasons, ouster of jurisdiction cannot be an explanation – and is 
probably not even part of a broader explanation – for the confinement of judicial 
review to public law. First, ouster of jurisdiction is rarely the reason for judicial 
review. Granted, one of the landmark cases in English judicial review concerned an 
ouster clause.15 But since 1969, when that case was decided, there are not many 
instances in which governments have succeeded in getting ouster clauses passed into 
law.16 Secondly, English judicial review did not come about after parliament first 
legislated to remove the courts’ jurisdiction over the decisions of an inferior tribunal. 
English judges developed principles of judicial review primarily so that they could 
decide on the lawfulness of public decisions when those decisions were challenged, 
rather than so that they could determine whether parliament had been successful in 
                                                        
14 Note that this is a point about the approach taken rather than the remedies available. The claim is not 
that the remedies would be much the same irrespective of whether the decision being challenged issued 
from a public or a private body. 
15 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL). 
16 Governments are likely often dissuaded from trying because the principles of judicial review militate 
against provisions exempting public bodies’ decisions from judicial scrutiny. Wherever courts can infer 
that parliament might not have intended a public body to be the final arbiter of its own powers, they 
will draw that inference – on the basis that the judiciary is under a general duty to decide on the 
lawfulness of a body’s decisions when citizens make a prima facie case that a decision unfairly interferes 
with their rights. When, in 2003, the then government introduced a Bill containing an ouster clause 
which stated unequivocally that the decisions of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal were to be 
completely immune to judicial review – were to stand, that is, irrespective of whether the tribunal had 
erred in law of contravened principles of natural justice – senior lawyers, jurists, and judges kicked up 
such a fuss that the clause was withdrawn from the Bill at its second reading in the lords: see Lord 
Woolf, “The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution” (2004) 63 CLJ 317, 327-9; Andrew Le Sueur, 
“Three Strikes and It’s Out? The UK Government’s Strategy to Oust Judicial Review from Immigration 
and Asylum Decision Making” [2004] PL 225, 233; Richard Rawlings, “Review, Revenge and Retreat” 
(2005) 68 MLR 378, 401-06.  
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ousting the courts’ jurisdiction to review the decisions of any particular public body. 
Thirdly, it would not be entirely correct to think of ouster of the courts’ jurisdiction 
as a purely public law issue. Self-regulatory bodies can include, in their contracts 
with their members, statutorily enforceable provisions obliging claimants to try 
arbitration before they can pursue a right of action in a court.17 Under the terms of 
these contracts, furthermore, parties will quite often relinquish their ECHR article 6 
rights to a determination by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law.18 It is perfectly conceivable, in other words, for private bodies to include de facto 
ouster clauses in contracts with their members.  
  
III. Public interest 
 
Since public bodies, unlike private agents, have powers to determine how citizens 
should act, it is important to try to prevent those bodies from abusing their powers. 
Prevention would be impossible if public bodies were allowed to use those powers 
however they wished. So it is a basic administrative law principle that public bodies 
cannot have absolute discretion. “The whole conception of unfettered discretion is 
inappropriate to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it 
may use them for the public good.” 19  Another possible explanation for judicial 
review being limited to public law, then, is that discretion is conferred on public 
bodies on the understanding that they exercise it exclusively for the public good, and 
the courts ought therefore to be able to police the exercise of this discretion more 
carefully than they would attend to the exercise of discretion by parties under the 
terms of a private agreement or arrangement.20 It would, of course, be incorrect to 
say that public bodies bear the unique constraint of being unable to choose their 
actions with their own interests in mind, given that private actors are sometimes 
constrained in the much same way (as when, for example, they act as fiduciaries). 
But the distinct fetter on the discretion of public bodies is that they have an 
obligation to take only public interest considerations, and often especially serious 
                                                        
17 See Arbitration Act 1996, s. 9; also UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law (1994), art. 8. 
18 See, e.g., Placito v Slater & Ors [2002] EWCA Civ 1863 at [50]-[51] (Potter LJ); Edwards v UK (1992) 15 
EHRR 417; Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 238 at [45] (Sir Anthony Clarke, MR). A 
court will only uphold such a provision so long as it is satisfied that the aggrieved party’s decision to 
relinquish this right was truly voluntary: see Stretford v FA, at [52]. 
19 H. W. R Wade & C. F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 296.  
20 See Jack Beatson, “‘Public’ and ‘Private’ in English Administrative Law” (1987) 103 LQR 34, 36-7.  
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public interest considerations, into account.21 Purely private bodies – though they 
obviously have to comply with the law, and though they may have to act with the 
best interests of other parties in mind – are never under the precise same obligation.  
Let us grant that the decisions which many public bodies make about citizens 
can have consequences the likes of which do not attach to decisions by private 
bodies. Is it nevertheless not an overstatement to say that public bodies alone are 
capable of making decisions contrary to the public interest? Where “Parliament has 
given a tribunal power to deprive a man of his livelihood for a particular cause, … 
the courts will intervene if there is a real substantial miscarriage of justice”, Denning 
LJ observed in 1952, continuing: “I see no reason why the powers of the court to 
intervene should be any less in the case of domestic tribunals.”22 His point was not 
that judicial review should be available whether the body is statutory or domestic; 
rather, it was that the absence of statutory underpinning should not be a bar to 
judicial intervention (in the case of domestic bodies, Denning noted, the court can 
intervene by granting declarations and injunctions). In other words, a court should 
intervene when private bodies make decisions with public interest implications 
similar to those which can arise in public decision-making contexts – except that 
intervening should never, in the case of purely private bodies, take the form of 
judicial review.  
But therein rests the puzzle: why should it not take this form? Decisions of 
public bodies can be amenable to judicial review even when they affect hardly 
anyone. By contrast, a self-regulatory body may be capable of, for example, granting 
and withholding valuable licences and opportunities coveted by large numbers of 
people; a considerable segment of the public may be interested, or potentially 
interested, in the body’s decisions, and yet this – certainly this by itself – will not 
suffice to make those decisions reviewable. One possible answer to the puzzle is that 
whereas it makes sense to make amenable to review decisions which always go to 
the public interest, to make reviewable a category of decisions which only sometimes 
have a public interest dimension, and which will in any event be controllable 
through private law doctrine, is to risk drawing arbitrary and unnecessary 
distinctions in the realm of private decision-making. Another, perhaps stronger 
answer is that a private decision which is likely to affect large numbers of people, or 
                                                        
21 Aston Cantlow PCC v Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37 at [7] (Lord Nicholls). 
22 Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329, 345-6.  
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which is subject to a duty to act only with regard for others, is not necessarily a 
decision with a public interest dimension – indeed, might be said not to have any 
such dimension if what is understood by public interest is the interest which citizens 
have in being able to challenge decisions which they consider to be based on an 
improper exercise of public power. It is not enough, on this line of reasoning, simply 
to claim that judicial review is confined to public law because public decision-
making has a public interest dimension. One has to be more precise: the confinement 
of judicial review to public law has to do with the fact that a primary function of 




Where there is a marked disparity in negotiating power between a self-regulating 
body and any private actor seeking to benefit from its decisions, that body will 
probably be able to exercise a significant degree of leverage over the parties’ 
negotiations; indeed, even the matter of whether negotiations take place could be 
within its control.24 Might the public have an interest in seeing judicial review lie 
against a body which is able to wield immense power over those dependent on its 
decisions, even if the activities of that body are neither authorized by positive law 
nor supported by the government?  
There are obiter dicta to the effect that a self-regulating body’s decisions 
should be reviewable when its powers are such that those subject to its decisions 
have no real choice but to submit to the exclusivity of the body’s authority,25 and at 
least one academic has argued that the proper test for amenability to review is 
whether the decision-maker exercises monopoly power. 26  But the courts have 
rejected monopoly power as the appropriate test, primarily because private bodies 
                                                        
23 Elliott, “Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and Purposes”, 80. 
24 See Robert L. Hale, “Force and the State: A Comparison of ‘Political’ and ‘Economic’ Compulsion” 
(1935) 35 Columb. L. Rev. 149; also H. W. Arthurs, “Without the Law”: Administrative Justice and Legal 
Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 192.  
25 See ex parte Datafin, at 845-6 (Lloyd LJ); also R. v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte 
Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 207, 219 (Neill LJ observing that, had he not been constrained by 
authority, he would have ruled that some decisions of the Jockey Club were judicially reviewable given 
its position of public importance and its near monopolistic powers in an area in which the general 
public has an interest and in which many people earn their livelihoods); R. v Jockey Club, ex parte RAM 
Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225 (Stuart-Smith LJ similarly observing that, had the matter been free of 
authority, he would have held the Jockey Club to be amenable to judicial review). 
26 Colin D. Campbell, “Monopoly Power as Public Power for the Purposes of Judicial Review” (2009) 
125 LQR 491.  
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performing entirely private functions can operate monopolistically, meaning that the 
test has the potential to extend judicial review to decisions which have no public law 
element.27 Even if the test were embraced, furthermore, it would explain only some 
instances of amenability, for there would still be cases where the courts assume 
supervisory jurisdiction notwithstanding that aggrieved parties are able to choose 
not to submit to the decisions which they are challenging.28 The monopoly powers 
test certainly illustrates how the limits of English judicial review are not fixed – how 
the outer limits of review could be expanded so that some decisions currently 
controlled through private law are redefined as decisions containing a public law 
element. But there is an obvious distinction to be drawn between making a 
prescriptive argument about where judicial review should reach and describing 
where it actually does reach. While the monopoly powers test points towards an 
interesting normative enquiry, it seems to fare less well as an explanation of why 
judicial review is confined to public law, and so, for the purposes of this article, there 
is no need to dwell on it.  
 
V. The rule of law 
 
Perhaps judicial review is confined to public law because the principles of judicial 
review affirm the basic features of the rule of law, and public bodies have a special 
obligation to make decisions which accord with the rule of law. Judicial review is 
premised on the idea that there should be government according to law: ultra vires 
doctrine is basically the principle that parliament confers statutory powers on a body 
on the understanding that it will uphold legality. The story of the growth of judicial 
review in the twentieth century is one of citizens’ increasing reliance on the State as a 
service provider, and of how the agencies and authorities made responsible for 
providing services had to be under the supervision of the courts if they were to be 
                                                        
27 See, e.g., R. v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909 (CA), 932-3 
(Hoffmann LJ); R. v Football Association Ltd, ex parte Football League Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833, 848 (Rose J) 
(“[T]he FA is not a body susceptible to judicial review either in general or, more particularly, at the 
instigation of the League, with whom it is contractually bound. Despite its virtually monopolistic 
powers and the importance of its decisions to many members of the public who are not contractually 
bound to it, it is … a domestic body whose powers arise from and duties exist in private law only”); R. 
(on the application of Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal Board (No. 1) [2005] EWHC 2197 (Admin) at [31] 
(Stanley Burnton J).  
28 See Elliott, “Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and Purposes”, 77-8. Although Campbell claims 
that the test explains most instances of amenability, he concedes that it cannot explain all instances: 
Campbell, “Monopoly Power as Public Power”, 495-6, 510-11.  
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brought to account whenever they misused powers entrusted to them by 
parliament.29 So it is that public bodies nowadays have a duty to make decisions 
which give citizens subject to those decisions access to justice, a right to be heard, 
confidence that rules will be applied consistently, and the ability to discover the rules 
that apply to them before they are applied – that they have a duty to make decisions 
in accordance with what is now statutorily recognized as “the constitutional 
principle of the rule of law”.30  
 But is the obligation to abide by rule of law principles relevant only to public 
law? The proposition that the rule of law is a private as well as a public law concept 
is difficult to assess, because defenders of it tend to rely on their own distinctive 
claims about what “the rule of law” means. Whether or not particular defences seem 
plausible depends on whether one accepts how the concept is being configured. If 
the rule of law protects against the arbitrary exercise of power then a private body 
might be challenged for acting contrary to the rule of law when it controls the 
allocation of a valuable resource and a claimant has had her application for that 
resource summarily denied. The basis of the challenge would be that the private 
body was abusing its immense power in a manner comparable with abuses of power 
by the State.31 But the challenge would be trading on the idea that the rule of law 
protects against the misuse of power generally as opposed to what it is commonly 
understood to protect against: abuses of the powers to make and apply laws to 
which citizens want reliable recourse and upon which they must be able to depend if 
they are to plan their affairs confident that their choices will not incur unwelcome 
liabilities.  
 Private law, according to one eminent public lawyer, “constitutes the major 
substance of the rule of law”32 because “efforts to bring governmental action within 
the limits of the rule of law presuppose that the relations between private citizens 
(and private groups or organizations) are already effectively regulated by law.”33 
                                                        
29 See Alfred Denning, Freedom under the Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1949), 67-126.  
30 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 1. 
31 See William Lucy, “The Rule of Law and Private Law”, in Private Law and the Rule of Law, ed. L. M. 
Austin & D. Klimchuk (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 41-66 at 63 (“[For] those gripped particularly tightly by the 
public law perspective … the only worrisome sources of potentially arbitrary power in the world are 
law-makers and their executive functionaries…. But … the world contains other worrisome sources of 
arbitrary power. One such source is surely one’s fellow citizens, as well as other legal (non-
governmental or non-executive) persons”). 
32 T. R. S. Allan, “The Rule of Law as the Rule of Private Law”, in Private Law and the Rule of Law, pp. 67-
91 at 68.  
33 Ibid 71.  
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When public officials exceed or abuse their jurisdiction they are, apart from in 
exceptional instances, subject “to the same rules of private and criminal law … in the 
same manner as private citizens”.34 The argument, note, is pointedly not that public 
and private law controversies over the rule of law are all of a piece. Rule of law 
considerations are indeed relevant to private law, but – the crux of the argument – 
they differ from rule of law considerations relevant to public law.  
While the enforcement of the rule of law consists, in private law, in the defence of the 
rights and duties that compose the established scheme of civil liability, in public law 
it means chiefly the prevention or correction of abuse of power by official state 
agencies…. [T]he rights protected by judicial review are … abstract and inchoate – 
rights not to be the victim of an abuse of power, which can take any of the various 
forms of unreasonableness or illegality…. [I]n public law the court must intervene 
only to remedy excesses or abuses of jurisdiction by a public authority, which is 
normally entitled (and required) to pursue a policy agenda in furtherance of its own 
view of the public interest.35 
 Perhaps the most straightforward reason for concluding that public and 
private decision-making bodies cannot be subject to the same rule of law obligations 
is that some of these obligations are either specific to law-making or concern 
congruence between enacted laws and the exercise of powers by bodies acting on the 
authority of those laws. If a body neither makes law nor has its decision-making 
authority conferred upon it by law – if it is a self-regulating body, making decisions 
in accordance with its own rules – it cannot be subject to the rule of law in the same 
way as can a body exercising public power. Part of the explanation for judicial 
review belonging to public law might be that it upholds not the rule of law but a 
particular facet of it: the requirement that those on whom powers over citizens are 
conferred should not be allowed to exceed those powers.36 
The difficulty with this proposition is that it runs up against two basic 
objections. First, some forms of governmental power (for example, the power to 
award pensions to widowers37) have been subject to review even though the power 
was not legally conferred. Secondly, some legally conferred powers (for example, 
                                                        
34 Ibid 82. 
35 T. R. S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 232. 
36 See Elliott, “Judicial Review’s Scope, Foundations and Purposes”, 78-9. (Note that Elliot’s argument is 
not that this specific facet of the rule of law serves on its own as a criterion for determining amenability 
to judicial review: see ibid 83-4.) 
37 See R. (on the application of Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29. For other 
examples, see B. V. Harris, “The ‘Third Source’ of Authority for Government Action Revisited” (2007) 
123 LQR 225, 226-7. 
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trustees’ statutory powers of investment38) are not subject to judicial review. The 
existence of a legally conferred power is not a prerequisite to, nor does misuse of 
such a power guarantee, the availability of judicial review; and so it is not clear how 
the association of judicial review with this one facet of rule of law might form part of 
the explanation as to why judicial review is exclusive to public law.  
Ultimately, any attempt to make the rule of law part of the explanation for 
the confinement of judicial review looks likely to founder, because most if not all rule 
of law obligations must be relevant to the decisions of private bodies in one way or 
another. These bodies will sometimes contravene rule of law principles by unfairly 
granting and withholding privileges, for example, or by failing to give a category of 
prospective applicants fair notice of their right to seek a decision from the body, or 
by making an applicant’s eligibility for a licence dependent on her meeting a 
criterion which it is impossible to satisfy. As was observed in section II, the 
standards of reasonableness and legality which the High Court applies in private law 
proceedings (under CPR Pt 8) are basically the same as those applied in public law 
proceedings. “[T]he constitutional principle requiring the rule of law to be 
observed”, according to Lord Steyn, “requires that a constitutional state must accord 
to individuals the right to know of a decision before their rights can be adversely 
affected.”39 This is a right which individuals ought to be accorded regardless of 
whether the body making the decision is public or private – likewise a person’s right 
to have decision makers respect various other principles of legality, such as the rights 
to present her case and to see like cases treated alike. Rule of law considerations 
always feature, if only implicitly, in cases concerning claims that public power has 
been exercised unlawfully. But it would be wrong to think that these considerations 
only ever arise in public law, for public bodies are not, when making decisions, 
under a unique obligation to respect the rule of law. And so one cannot successfully 
invoke the rule of law as an explanation as to why judicial review is confined to these 
bodies. 
 
VI. Procedure and remedies 
 
There would only be a point to the courts expanding judicial review into the realm of 
                                                        
38 See Trustee Act 2000, s. 3(1). 
39 R. (on the application of Anufrijeva) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 36 at [28].  
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private law if there was something judicial review could bring to the table that was 
not already part of the stock of private lawyers. Perhaps judicial review is confined 
to public law because there is no need for things to be otherwise. With the demise of 
O’Reilly v Mackman40 and the weakening of the principle of procedural exclusivity, 
the mode of commencement of proceedings – whether a claim was initiated in 
private or public law – is unlikely to be of any consequence;41 some claims initiated 
as private law claims could proceed via judicial review, and in the course of civil 
proceedings the decisions of public bodies might be impugned.  In most instances, 
furthermore, whatever judicial review could bring to private law litigation will 
already be supplied by private law remedies. Success in seeking judicial review does 
not automatically entitle an applicant to a private law remedy – there has to be 
something about the unlawfulness of the public body’s decision (e.g., misfeasance in 
public office, breach of a statutory duty) to which the claimant can point as 
establishing civil liability.42 But a private law remedy can usually extend to the same 
places as can judicial review: claimants challenging the decisions of domestic bodies 
can quite often, by seeking a declaration of right combined with an injunction, obtain 
much the same remedy as would have been granted if judicial review had been 
available. Could having judicial review lie against the decision of a domestic body 
achieve anything that could not already be achieved within the domain of private 
law? 
It would be wrong to think that it could achieve absolutely nothing. The 
availability of judicial review against a domestic body’s decision could extend the 
rights currently enjoyed by aggrieved parties, and might even accord to them some 
rights which presently they do not have. There are limited opportunities for would-
be claimants to sue domestic bodies when the allegation is simply that the body in 
question has acted unreasonably or unfairly, but claims on such grounds would 
presumably be easier to bring if the decisions of these bodies were made reviewable. 
                                                        
40 [1983] 2 AC 237 (HL).  
41  It would be wrong to say that it will never be of consequence. If an impugned decision is 
straightforwardly a matter of public law, for example, a court might consider it inappropriate to assume 
an open choice of procedure: see, e.g., Carnwath LJ’s judgment in Trim v North Dorset DC [2010] EWCA 
Civ 1446, esp. at [26]. 
42 Judicial review will not normally be available if the claimant’s dispute with a public body concerns a 
contract or some other matter governed by private law, though courts do sometimes consider judicial 
review to be appropriate notwithstanding the possibility of a private law claim: see, e.g., R. (on the 
application of London Corp) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 
1765 at [15]-[16] (Pill LJ); R. (on the application of Weaver) v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] 
EWCA Civ 587 at [70] (Elias LJ), [102] (Lord Collins). 
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Extending supervisory jurisdiction to the decisions of a domestic body might expand 
the range of expectation-based claims available to a claimant, since certain types of 
legitimate expectation which do not form the basis for estoppel claims (such as the 
right to be consulted) can sustain applications for judicial review.43 Since judicial 
review is a supervisory rather than an appellate process, a reviewing court does not 
replace a successfully challenged decision with a decision of its own but rather 
retrospectively nullifies it. So if a claimant were successfully to apply for judicial 
review of, say, a domestic body’s decision to expel her from its ranks, the 
consequence would be not that the claimant would be restored to the body or 
awarded damages for having been expelled, but rather would be presumed never to 
have been – and so would have the right to be treated as never having been – 
expelled in the first place. Furthermore, the determination that a domestic body’s 
decisions are amenable to judicial review might supply aggrieved parties with an 
action unavailable in private law owing to the fact that the pursuit of any 
appropriate private law remedy, unlike the availability of judicial review, depends 
on their having a legal relationship with the decision-making body. 44  Whereas 
claimants in private law actions normally have to be able to show that their own 
legal rights are somehow threatened or infringed, judicial review never confines 
standing to rights-holders: interest groups and publicly-minded citizens can initiate 
proceedings, even though their own rights might not be directly affected. 45 
Rendering amenable to review the decisions of bodies currently categorized as 
private would, wherever there is a prima facie case of illegality, open up those bodies 
to the possibility of challenge by parties to whom they have no direct obligation. 
Extending judicial review to decisions of domestic bodies would not, in short, be 
without legal consequences. 
 But would the consequences be welcome overall? Any answer to this 
question must be pure guesswork. Given that judicial review can protect rights in a 
                                                        
43 See, e.g., Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 401 (Lord Fraser) 
(“[E]ven where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has no legal right to it, as a matter of private 
law, he may have a legitimate expectation of receiving the benefit or privilege, and, if so, the courts will 
protect his expectation by judicial review as a matter of public law”).  
44 See Colin D. Campbell, “The Nature of Power as Public in English Judicial Review” (2009) 68 CLJ 90, 
91; Martyn Hopper, “Financial Services Regulation and Judicial Review: The Fault Lines”, in Commercial 
Regulation and Judicial Review, ed. J. Black et al. (Oxford: Hart, 1998), 63-95 at 77 (the characterization of 
the regulatory functions of self-regulating financial bodies as confined to private law “place[s] severe 
limitations on the ability of investors … to challenge the decisions of regulators with whom they have 
no contractual relationship”).  
45 See Jason N. E. Varuhas, “The Reformation of English Administrative Law? ‘Rights’, Rhetoric and 
Reality” (2013) 72 CLJ 369, 380-3.  
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number of ways that private law remedies cannot, perhaps – we are deep in the 
realms of speculation – making the decisions of a private body subject to judicial 
review options as well as to private law doctrines could put a claimant in a better 
position than that which she occupies when a court determines that the decision 
which she challenges only concerns the body’s private law obligations. That there 
would be a net advantage to making the decisions of a private body reviewable 
seems, however, highly improbable. To make a body categorized as private subject 
to the comparably relaxed standing requirements which operate in judicial review 
applications would only seem to make sense were a court to rule that there is, in fact, 
a public law element to the body’s decisions. For the point of according standing to 
parties with no direct rights against a decision-maker is to recognize that the 
decision-maker has failed to comply with a duty to the public at large rather than 
one owed only to citizens who have suffered as a consequence of the failure.46 
Considering that judicial review applications tend to be dealt with quickly and are 
subject to very short time limits, moreover, and that undue delay in making an 
application can result in a refusal to grant relief, the speed of the process alone might 
make it unsuited to dealing with some instances of civil litigation47 (and where the 
process is suited to the litigation, it will be otiose anyway if the civil claimant can 
expedite by applying for summary judgment and/or strike-out 48 ). Even if the 
decisions of a currently private body were to be made reviewable, a judge would still 
have to give permission before a petition for review could proceed. If a private law 
action were instead to be treated as a judicial review application, the process might 
significantly constrain the claimant, because strategies which would be available as 
of right (and on which claimants invariably depend) at a full trial – such as 
introducing oral evidence, undertaking cross-examination, and exchanging affidavits 
– would either not be available or would be available only at the discretion of the 
court.  
 Which court would this be? If judicial review were extended to some 
                                                        
46 See Jason N. E. Varuhas, “The Public Interest Conception of Public Law: Its Procedural Origins and 
Substantive Implications”, in Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance, ed J. 
Bell et al. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), 45-86 at 58-60, 66; also Varuhas, “The Reformation of English 
Administrative Law?”, 410.  
47 See Harry Woolf, Protection of the Public – A New Challenge (London: Stevens & Sons, 1990), 15. A more 
serious concern runs from the opposite direction: claimants might try to sidestep the safeguards and 
strictures of judicial review by seeking ordinary remedies against public bodies, or (where permissible) 
by challenging a public body’s decision in the course of civil or criminal proceedings.  
48 See Dawn Oliver, “Public Law Procedures and Remedies – Do We Need Them?” [2002] PL 91.  
 17 
instances of purely private decision-making, the Administrative Court would very 
likely have a larger case load. But this is assuming that judicial review would remain 
solely within the province of the Administrative Court. If it were the lawfulness of a 
domestic tribunal’s decision that was being challenged, there would presumably 
have to be some explanation as to why the judicial review application was being 
dealt with by a specialized court with administrative law jurisdiction. What, 
furthermore, could it actually mean to speak of extending judicial review to purely 
private decision-making? Recall the plight of B at the outset of this article. Judicial 
pronouncements entertaining the possibility of extension invariably show judges to 
have in mind particular examples of self-regulatory bodies. But presumably 
parliament or the courts would have to distinguish between private decisions which 
in principle are, and private decisions which are not, amenable to judicial review (as 
indeed is the case with public decisions). In dealing with decisions which are in 
principle reviewable, the courts, when determining which decisions should be 
reviewed, would still have to address the question that confronts them now: the 
question of why judicial review has been expanded this far but not further. A variety 
of what are essentially pragmatic considerations – including, no doubt, others 
besides the ones I have touched upon here – seem to form part of the explanation as 
to why English judicial review is exclusive to public law. 
 
VII. Confinement by law 
 
Before concluding, I should at least briefly draw attention to one other, perhaps 
obvious, explanation as to why some decisions will not be amenable to judicial 
review. In some instances, the expansion of judicial review beyond public decision-
making will simply not be an option. The basic principle of proportionality, for 
example, is that any interference by the State with the liberty of the individual is 
unjustifiable if it exceeds what is required for the State to go about pursuing its 
legitimate aims.49 So it is perfectly understandable that the courts have only ever 
resorted to proportionality – in so far as they have developed it as a separate ground 
                                                        
49 See SS (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 550 at [38] (Laws LJ) 
(“[E]very intrusion by the state on the freedom of the individual stands in need of justification. 
Accordingly, any interference which is greater than required for the state’s proper purpose cannot be 
justified. This is at the core of proportionality; it articulates the discipline which proportionality imposes 
on decision-makers”).   
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of judicial review in English law – to test the lawfulness of public authority decisions. 
The idea of extending judicial review to the decisions of private bodies is a 
straightforward non-starter wherever the law expressly forbids such an extension. 
Human rights law provides perhaps the most obvious illustration of this point. The 
European Convention on Human Rights is essentially a collection of obligations 
imposed on member States, and the Human Rights Act 1998, in establishing as 
domestic rights those which are set out in the Convention, likewise imposes 
obligations only on organs of the State and not on private individuals and bodies. In 
English law, judicial review claims based specifically on the contention that a 
decision unlawfully interferes with a Convention right must concern the decision of 
a public authority or any person whose functions are of a public nature.50 Sometimes, 
it matters not whether there might be some advantage to extending judicial review to 




In this article, I have undertaken a brief analysis of possible explanations for the 
confinement of judicial review to public law. To say that the lay of the land turns out 
to be complicated is not the most riveting of conclusions. But the point of the exercise 
has been to draw attention to the contours of a problem rather than to try to reach a 
conclusion about it. The search for a magic formula the presence or absence of which 
brings judicial review into or takes it out of the equation seems ill-advised: a formula 
is likely to account for both too little and too much – to fail to explain why some 
decisions are reviewable even though (according to the formula) they should not be, 
and why some decisions are not reviewable even though (according to the formula) 
they should be. Various reasons, or combinations of reasons, can explain why 
decisions issuing from a particular body are amenable to judicial review (or, indeed, 
why decisions which once were not amenable to review now are). Some of the more 
                                                        
50 Human Rights Act 1998, ss. 3(3)(b), 6(1). A public authority could be a core or hybrid public authority, 
and a court, in considering if a decision should be judicially reviewable, might find it impossible to 
draw the distinction between a hybrid authority’s public and private activities with precision: see, e.g., 
Poplar Housing & Regeneration v Donoghue, at [66] (Lord Woolf, CJ). That the distinction has taxed the 
courts is especially clear from the 3-2 split in YL v Birmingham CC [2007] UKHL 27 over whether a health 
care company subject to statutory regulation was performing functions of a public nature. The crucial 
point for our purposes is that courts will draw the distinction, and will rule that judicial review will not 
be available if the hybrid authority, in making the impugned decision, was exercising part of its private 
as opposed to its public function.  
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compelling of these reasons, I hope to have shown, are not necessarily the most 
lauded ones; and certainly two of the standard explanations for the confinement of 
judicial review to public law – jurisdiction and the rule of law – are not as convincing 
as one might expect them to be. If we are to understand why judicial review belongs 
solely to public law, then we perhaps do best to focus mainly on a number of low-
key, matter-of-fact considerations such as public law standing requirements, the 
differences between judicial review and private law remedies, the role of the 
Administrative Court, the question of just how far into the realm of private law 
judicial review could feasibly be extended, and the rules which confine judicial 
review to particular legal contexts. 
 
